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ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, deep learning (DL) has been successfully
applied to many industrial domain-specific tasks. However, the
current state-of-the-art DL software still suffers from quality issues,
which raises great concern especially in the context of safety- and
security-critical scenarios. Adversarial examples (AEs) represent
a typical and important type of defects needed to be urgently ad-
dressed, on which a DL software makes incorrect decisions. Such
defects occur through either intentional attack or physical-world
noise perceived by input sensors, potentially hindering further in-
dustry deployment. The intrinsic uncertainty nature of deep learn-
ing decisions can be a fundamental reason for its incorrect behavior.
Although some testing, adversarial attack and defense techniques
have been recently proposed, it still lacks a systematic study to
uncover the relationship between AEs and DL uncertainty.
In this paper, we conduct a large-scale study towards bridging
this gap. We first investigate the capability of multiple uncertainty
metrics in differentiating benign examples (BEs) and AEs, which
enables to characterize the uncertainty patterns of input data. Then,
we identify and categorize the uncertainty patterns of BEs and AEs,
and find that while BEs and AEs generated by existing methods
do follow common uncertainty patterns, some other uncertainty
patterns are largely missed. Based on this, we propose an automated
testing technique to generate multiple types of uncommon AEs
and BEs that are largely missed by existing techniques. Our fur-
ther evaluation reveals that the uncommon data generated by our
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method is hard to be defended by the existing defense techniques
with the average defense success rate reduced by 35%. Our results
call for attention and necessity to generate more diverse data for
evaluating quality assurance solutions of DL software.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Software testing and de-
bugging; • Computing methodologies→ Neural networks.
KEYWORDS
Deep learning, uncertainty, adversarial attack, software testing
ACM Reference Format:
Xiyue Zhang, Xiaofei Xie, Lei Ma, Xiaoning Du, Qiang Hu, Yang Liu, Jian-
jun Zhao, and Meng Sun. 2020. Towards Characterizing Adversarial De-
fects of Deep Learning Software from the Lens of Uncertainty. In 42nd
International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE ’20), May 23–29,
2020, Seoul, Republic of Korea. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 13 pages. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3377811.3380368
1 INTRODUCTION
In company with the booming of available domain-specific big
data and hardware acceleration, deep learning (DL) experienced
big performance leap in the past few years, in achieving compet-
itive performance in many cutting edge applications (e.g., image
processing [45], speech recognition [19], sentiment analysis [6],
e-commerce recommendation [59], video game control [36]). How-
ever, the state-of-the-art DL software still suffers from quality issues.
A deep neural network (DNN) that achieves high prediction accu-
racy can still be vulnerable to adversarial examples (AEs) [2]. For
example, an image recognition DL software can be easily fooled
by pixel-level noises [51] or noises perceived in a physical-world
situation [8, 52]. The quality and reliability issues, without properly
addressing or confining, could potentially hinder more widespread
adoption of DL software especially in the applications with higher
requirements of safety and security (e.g., autonomous driving, med-
ical diagnosis).
The incorrect decision of a DL software can trace back to sev-
eral typical sources and patterns (e.g., generalization capability
issue, robustness issue [21]). Up to present, AEs remain to be one
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(a) Prediction Confidence (b) Bayesian Uncertainty
Figure 1: Prediction Confidence and Bayesian Uncertainty.
of the most notable types of DL defects, which reveals the qual-
ity and robustness issues of the DL software. Although the arms
races of many recently proposed adversarial attack [4, 14, 24, 37],
defense [13, 15, 17, 40, 43, 53, 57] and testing [7, 41, 52, 55] continu-
ously escalate, most of these techniques are rather ad-hoc. Thus far,
research efforts on understanding and interpretation of AEs and
benign examples (BEs) are still at an early stage [50]. Uncertainty
provides a new perspective to characterize AEs and BEs, towards
understanding and designing better quality assurance techniques
for DL software, e.g., testing, adversarial attack/defense.
To bridge this gap, in this paper, we study 4 state-of-the-art
Bayesian uncertainty metrics (based on the statistical analysis of
multi-shot executions) along with the one-shot execution metrics,
i.e., prediction confidence score (PCS) of the DL software under
analysis (see Fig. 1 and definitions in § 2). We perform a large-scale
comparative study to investigate the sensitivity/capability of these
metrics in differentiating AEs and BEs, which are important in-
dicators to characterize DL runtime behaviors. We find that PCS
and Variation Ratio in terms of original prediction (VRO) (§ 2) are
among the best candidates with such capability, and they are se-
lected for further input data characterization. Then, an obvious
question arises: what is the relation between the AEs/BEs generated
by the state-of-the-art adversarial attack/testing techniques and these
uncertainty metrics? In particular, do these AEs/BEs follow some pat-
terns in terms of uncertainty? Our in-depth analysis reveals that
AEs/BEs generated by existing techniques [4, 14, 25, 37, 38, 55]
largely fall into two common patterns (that we refer as common
input samples): (1) AEs tend to have low PCS and high VRO uncer-
tainty, and (2) BEs often come with high PCS and low VRO.
Based on the above observation, further questions naturally arise:
What do those uncommon inputs look like and can we generate them
possibly and automatically? and Would these uncommon data in-
puts differ from common inputs, e.g., are they even more challenging
to be correctly handled by a DL software? To answer these ques-
tions, we propose a genetic algorithm (GA) based automated test
generation technique that iteratively generates uncommon input
samples guided by uncertainty metrics. We implement the pro-
posed technique as a tool named KuK (to Know the UnKnown),
and demonstrate its effectiveness in generating uncommon inputs
on a large benchmark, including three datasetsMNIST, CIFAR10, Im-
ageNet across four different DL model architectures LeNet-5, NIN ,
ResNet-20,MobileNet. In line with existing adversarial defense tech-
niques, our comparative experiments against the state-of-the-art
adversarial attack/testing techniques also reveal that the uncom-
mon samples could be more challenging to be correctly handled by
DL software in many cases. Such uncommon samples represent a
new type of hazard and potential defects to DL software, which so
far lacks investigation and should draw further attention during
future quality assurance solution design.
In summary, this paper investigates the following research ques-
tions with the support of a large-scale study:
• RQ1:What is the capability of the state-of-the-art uncertainty
metrics in differentiating AEs and BEs?
• RQ2: Do the AEs and BEs generated by the state-of-the-art ad-
versarial attack/testing techniques follow common uncertainty
patterns? If so, what are such common patterns?
• RQ3: Is it possible to generate those uncommon data that is
missed by the state-of-the-art attack/testing techniques? Is KuK
useful in generating uncommon data?
• RQ4: To what extent are the uncommon samples defended by ex-
isting adversarial defense techniques compared with the common
ones?
Through answering RQ1 and RQ2, we aim to characterize behav-
iors of DL software on AEs and BEs from the uncertainty perspec-
tive, and investigate whether some common patterns are followed
by data inputs generated through current state-of-the-art adver-
sarial attack/testing techniques. Our study confirms the existence
of the common patterns for such generated data (i.e., low PCS and
high VRO for AEs, high PCS and low VRO for BEs). It also identifies
new uncommon sample categories which are missed by existing
techniques.
RQ3 and RQ4 focus on understanding the feasibility to obtain the
uncommon samples (i.e., RQ3) and the impact of such samples on
the quality and reliability of DL software (i.e., RQ4). Our evaluation
results confirm that the uncommon samples could be generated
with proper testing guidance. Such uncommon samples, represent-
ing a new type of generated test data, could bypass a variety of
adversarial defense techniques with higher success rates. Thus, it
is quite important to generate such uncommon inputs to reveal
the hidden defects of DL software for vulnerability analysis and
further enhancement, especially for safety- and security-critical
scenarios. We believe such uncommon data could be an important
clue towards building trustworthy DL solutions, which should draw
special attention for further quality assurance solution design.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We perform an empirical study on four state-of-the-art Bayesian
uncertainty metrics and one prediction confidence metric to
investigate their ability to differentiate BEs and AEs, i.e., data
inputs that can/cannot be correctly handled by a DL software.
Among these metrics, PCS and VRO outperform the others in
achieving higher differentiating accuracy.
• We perform a systematic study on the BEs and AEs generated
by six state-of-the-art adversarial attack/testing techniques (i.e.,
FGSM [14], BIM [25], Deepfool [37], C&W [4], DeepHunter [55],
TensorFuzz [38]) to identify potential uncertainty patterns in
terms of PCS and VRO. Our results reveal that (1) AEs and BEs
from existing techniques largely follow two common patterns
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while the other patterns (denoted as uncommon patterns) are
largely missed by existing methods, and (2) the characteristics
of AEs generated by the testing tools differ from those by the
adversarial attack techniques.
• We propose a GA-based automated testing technique for DL
software, implemented as a tool KuK , towards generating input
samples with diverse uncertainty patterns. Especially, our evalu-
ation on three datasets MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet across four
different model architectures LeNet-5, NIN , ResNet-20,MobileNet
demonstrates its effectiveness in generating uncommon input
samples that are largely missed by existing techniques.
• We further investigate how the adversarial defense techniques [13,
15, 17, 40, 43, 53, 57] react to the uncommon samples, in line with
the samples generated by adversarial attack techniques. Our re-
sults indicate that the current defense techniques are often biased
towards particular patterns of samples. The generated uncom-
mon samples can bypass such defense techniques with a high
success rate, potentially causing severe threats to the quality and
reliability of DL software. For example, on the model NIN , the
uncommon data achieve 97.5% success rate on bypassing the
mutation-based defense, while the common data only make it
5.5%.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND OVERVIEW
2.1 Deep Neural Networks
Definition 1 (Deep Neural Network). A deep neural network
(DNN)M is a function P = M(x) that maps an input x to a predictive
probability vector P . The output label ofM on input data x is LM (x) =
argmaxi ∈C P[i] where C is the set of classes and P = M(x).
In general, a DNN learns to extract features from the distribution
of training data layer by layer, and provides the decision on each
candidate class with some probabilistic confidence. A higher pre-
dictive probability value of a class often indicates higher prediction
confidence on that decision label.
Definition 2 (Benign Example). A benign example (BE) x with
ground truth label y is an input sample, such that the prediction deci-
sion of a DNNM is consistent with the ground truth label: LM (x) = y.
Benign examples refer to those inputs that could be correctly
handled by a given DNN modelM .
Definition 3 (Adversarial Example). An adversarial example
(AE) is an input x ′ similar to a benign example x by adding some
minor perturbation δ , (i.e., x ′ = x + δ ), but resulting in a different
prediction decision of a DNNM (i.e., LM (x ′) , LM (x)).
Existing attack methods usually generate the AEs by manipu-
lating the output of the logit layer or softmax layer of a DNN M ,
which gradually decreases in the output probability of ground truth
label and increases in the probability of other labels. In this way,
the prediction decision is shifted to other labels. Based on direct
observations on the prediction results of such AEs, we identify that
a typical type of unreliable prediction is usually accompanied by
two classes that have close probability confidence values.
Definition 4 (Prediction Confidence Score). Given a DNN
M and an input x , the prediction confidence score (PCS) of the input
x onM is defined as
PCS(x ,M) = max
i ∈C P[i] − maxi ∈C\c∗ P[i]
where C is the set of classes, c∗ = LM (x) and P = M(x).
Intuitively, PCS depicts the probability difference between the
two classes with the highest probabilities, which provides an uncer-
tainty proxy from the aspect of distance to the geometric boundary.
For an input x , the smaller the PCS(x ,M), the closer x is to the de-
cision boundary between the top-two classes. As a result, it is more
likely to cross the boundary with noise perturbations. In the fol-
lowing sections, we use PCS(X ,M) to denote {PCS(x ,M)|x ∈ X },
where X is a set of inputs.
2.2 Bayesian Uncertainty Measures
Besides prediction confidence based metrics, Bayesian-based meth-
ods are recently proposed to estimate DNN’s uncertainty through
multi-shot execution analysis [11] (see Fig. 1). From the princi-
pled Bayesian perspective, DNNs are not regarded as deterministic
functions with fixed parameters. Instead, the parameters of DNNs
are treated as random variables, which obey a prior distribution
p(ω). The posterior distribution q(ω |D) is then approximated given
a training data set D, based on which uncertainty estimates can
be obtained. The relationship between the uncertainty represen-
tative of prediction confidence score and Bayesian uncertainty esti-
mates is shown in Fig. 1. Intuitively, prediction confidence score
reflects a distance abstraction to the fixed geometric boundary w.r.t.
a point-estimate neural network whose parameters are fixed; while
Bayesian method ensembles a set of networks whose weights follow
some probability distribution.
However, due to the complexity of DNNs, it is often impractical
to sample infinitely many weights from the distribution to perform
the runtime execution. To this end, the state-of-the-art approach to
obtain uncertainty estimates makes use of the dropout technique
from multiple runs (Monte Carlo dropout [12]). Although dropout
is originally proposed as a regularization method in the training
process to avoid over-fitting, in the context of uncertainty estima-
tion, dropout is leveraged in the testing process, which samples
weights from the distribution to obtain DNN instances. As a result,
it ensembles a number of neural networks with different weights. In
each prediction execution, it randomly drops out some units in the
DNN, which may cause different prediction results. As a result, it
allows to obtain uncertainty estimates efficiently and scales to real-
world neural networks. Specifically, there are three commonly-used
metrics to estimate uncertainty [11], i.e., variation ratio, predictive
entropy and mutual information.
2.2.1 Variation Ratio. Variation ratio measures the dispersion from
the dominant class of the prediction (i.e., the predicted class with
the highest frequency in multiple predictions).
Definition 5 (Variation Ratio). Given a modelM and an input
x , the variation ratio (VR) of the input x is defined as
VR(x ,M) = 1 −
∑
k ∈{1, ...,T } LMkd (x) = lmax
T
where Md is the model with dropout-enable and LMkd
denotes the
k-th prediction result by Md . T is the total number of prediction
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execution by Md . lmax represents the dominant label from most of
the T predictions.
Another variant of the variation ratio in terms of the original
prediction (the prediction of the model under analysis) is defined
as follows:
Definition 6. Given a model M and an input x , the variation
ratio for original prediction (denoted as VRO) of the input x is defined
as
VRO(x ,M) = 1 −
∑
k ∈{1, ...,T } LMkd (x) = LM (x)
T
where LM (x) is the prediction result from the original modelM .
Intuitively, VR measures the general uncertainty of the decision
with the highest frequency (i.e., whether most predictions agree
with the same result) while VRO represents the stability around the
prediction mode of modelM (i.e., whether the majority predictions
agree with the original result). The higher the VR or VRO is, the
more uncertain the prediction is.
2.2.2 Predictive Entropy. Predictive entropy originates from in-
formation theory and measures the average amount of informa-
tion contained in a stochastic source of predictive output. When
all classes are predicted with equal probability in the form of a
uniform distribution, the decision carries the most information,
indicating high uncertainty. In contrast, when one of the classes is
predicted with high probability value (e.g., 0.9), then the prediction
is relatively certain.
Definition 7. Given all the predictive probability distributions
Pkd = M
k
d (x), k ∈ {1, ...,T } of an input x across T predictions on
dropout enabling modelMd , the predictive entropy is defined as
PE(x ,M) = −
∑
i ∈C
( 1
T
∑
k
Pkd (i)) log(
1
T
∑
k
Pkd (i))
where Pkd (i) denotes the probability value of a particular class i on
the k-th prediction of modelMd .
2.2.3 Mutual Information. Mutual information quantifies the amount
of information obtained about one random variable through the
observations of the other random variable. In the case of DNNs, the
two random variables are prediction LM (x) and the posterior of the
model parameters ω, whose distribution is approximated through
T stochastic forward passes of dropout enabled modelMd . We use
ωk to denote an instance of the model parameters sampled from
the posterior distribution.
Definition 8. Given the predictive probability distributions Pkd =
Mkd (x), k ∈ {1, ...,T } of an input x in T predictions, the mutual
information of input x is defined as
MI (x ,M) = PE(x ,M) + 1
T
∑
i,k
(Pkd (i) log Pkd (i))
where Pkd (i) is used to approximate Pd (i |ωk ) in a similar way to
predictive entropy, based on the probability vectors obtained through
different stochastic forward passes.
Table 1: Subject datasets and DNN models.
Dataset DNN Model #Neuron #Layer Acc.(%)
MNIST LeNet-5 268 9 99.0%
CIFAR-10 NIN 1418 12 88.2%ResNet-20 2,570 70 86.9%
ImageNet MobileNet 38,904 87 87.1%*
* The reported top-5 test accuracy of pretrained DNN model in [20].
2.3 Overview
In this paper, we aim to understand the capability of different un-
certainty portrayals, on which behaviors of AEs and BEs are further
characterized. Fig. 2 shows an overview of our work, summarized
as two major components: (1) an empirical study about the uncer-
tainty metrics and characteristics of the existing data inputs, and
(2) the data generation algorithm that generates input samples with
uncommon patterns and potential applications. Specifically, we first
perform an empirical study towards understanding the capability of
different uncertainty metrics on distinguishing AEs and BEs (§ 3.2).
Then, we propose a way of categorizing AEs and BEs based on two
perspectives: the prediction confidence score from the perspective
of the single-shot model execution and the uncertainty estimates
from the statistical perspective of multi-shot execution. Next, we
study the uncertainty patterns of the BEs and AEs generated by the
existing adversarial attack/testing tools (§ 3.4).
From the empirical study, we find that the existing AEs and BEs
follow specific uncertainty patterns. Then, We propose a genetic-
algorithm-based approach to generate the uncommon data inputs
(§ 4), whose uncertainty patterns are different from the patterns
that existing data fall into. We identify and analyze the importance
of data with diverse uncertainty patterns from a testing perspec-
tive. Finally, we evaluate the capability of such uncommon data in
bypassing a variety of defense techniques (§ 5.2).
3 EMPIRICAL STUDY
In this section, we first perform a comparative study about the capa-
bility of different uncertainty metrics in distinguishing AEs and BEs.
Then, we conducted a follow-up investigation of the characteristics
of existing AEs/BEs from the uncertainty perspective.
3.1 Subject Dataset and Data Preparation
3.1.1 Datasets. We selected three popular publicly available datasets
(i.e., MNIST [26], CIFAR-10 [23], and ImageNet [45]) as the evalua-
tion subject datasets (see Table 1).
MNIST is for handwritten digit image recognition, containing
60, 000 training data and 10, 000 test data, with a total number of
70, 000 data categorized in 10 classes (i.e., handwritten digits from 0
to 9). Each MNIST image is of size 28× 28× 1 with a single channel.
CIFAR-10 is a collection of images for general-purpose image
classification, including 50, 000 training data and 10, 000 test data
in 10 different classes (e.g., airplane, bird, cat and ship), with 6, 000
images per class. Each CIFAR-10 image is of size 32 × 32 × 3 with
three channels. The classification task of CIFAR-10 is generally
difficult than that of MNIST due to the data size and complexity.
Characterizing Adversarial Defects of DL Software from the Lens of Uncertainty ICSE ’20, May 23–29, 2020, Seoul, Republic of Korea
Adversarial Data
FGSM
PCS
VR
Low PCS
High VR
(LH)
HL Benign
LH Adv
HH
LL
HL Adv
...
BIM
Deepfool
C&W
Benign Test Data
Data Classification Existing Data Study  Applications
Population 
Initialization
Uncertainty based 
Fitness 
Calculation
Image Crossover
Image Mutation
Objective?
Bypass 
Defense
Model 
Analysis
DeepHunter
TensorFuzz
Testing Attack
High PCS
High VR
(HH)
Low PCS
Low VR
(LL)
High PCS
Low VR
(HL)
Uncertainty Metrics Study
Variation Ratio
Variation Ration 
Original
Predictive 
Entropy
Mutual 
Information
Data Generation
...
(a) Empirical study             (b) Uncommon Data Generation and Application 
Prediction 
Confidence
Figure 2: The overview of our study and its application.
ImageNet is a large-scale practice-sized dataset, which is used as
the database for large-scale visual recognition challenge (ILSVRC)
towards general-purpose image classification. The complexity of
ImageNet is characterized by a training set comprised of over 1
million images, together with a validation set comprised of 50, 000
images and a test set with 150, 000 images. Each image is of size
224 × 224 × 3.
For each dataset, we study several popular DNN models used
in previous work [18, 20, 26, 27], which achieve competitive test
accuracy (Table 1).
The DL models we study in this paper are all with convolu-
tional architectures. However, our approach is generic and could
be applied to other network architectures such as recurrent neural
networks. Our approach focuses on the uncertainty nature of DNN.
Whether the calculation methods of the uncertainty metrics are
available determines the feasibility of applying our approach to DL
models with other architectures. Basically, the only requirement on
the DL models is with a classification setting, thus the model output
would be a probability distribution among a set of classes and the
uncertainty metrics can be obtained. In a word, our approach can
be applied to DNN classification tasks, independent of the model
architectures.
3.1.2 Adversarial Example Generation Tools. We chose four state-
of-the-art adversarial attack tools, i.e., FGSM [14] (Fast Gradient
Sign Method), BIM [25] (Basic Iterative Method), Deepfool [37] and
C&W [4] attacks, to generate adversarial examples. Specifically, we
used the existing Python tool-set foolbox [44] to perform these
attacks and each attack is configured with the default setting.
We also selected two state-of-the-art automated testing tools for
deep neuron networks, i.e., DeepHunter [55] and TensorFuzz [38],
both of which adopt coverage-based fuzzing techniques. For Deep-
Hunter, we generated AEs with the k-Multisection Neuron Cover-
age (KMNC) and Neuron Coverage (NC) as the guidance. Following
the configuration in [41, 55], we set the parameter k as 1,000 for
KMNC and the threshold as 0.75 for NC. TensorFuzz is configured
with the default setting used in [38].
3.1.3 Data Preparation. Overall, we prepared the following three
sets of data: one set of benign examples, one set of AEs generated
Table 2: Number of adversarial examples generated by the
testing tools and adversarial attacks.
Model DH-KMNC DH-NC TensorFuzz Adv_attacks
LeNet-5 2,980 4,607 1,436 4×9,000
NIN 5,715 9,110 3,848 4×9,000
ResNet-20 6,960 9,249 2,465 4×9,000
MobileNet 3,314 20,541 13,999 4×9,000
by the attack methods, and one set of AEs generated by testing
tools (see Table 2):
• BenignData. For each dataset, we randomly sampled 9, 000 test
data, which can be correctly predicted by the models, as the
benign dataset for each model.
• AttackAdv. For each input in BenignData, we generated four types
of AEs with the four attack methods, resulting in a total of 36, 000
AEs. (Column Adv_attacks in Table 2).
• TestAdv. For each dataset, we randomly sampled 500 benign
examples as the initial seeds. Then, we ran DeepHunter and
TensorFuzz for each model with 5,000 iterations. The columns
DH-KMNC, DH-NC, and TensorFuzz show the number of adver-
sarial examples generated by DeepHunter with KMNC and NC
guidance, and Tensorfuzz.
3.2 RQ1: Empirical Study on Uncertainty
Metrics
The objective of RQ1 is to study the relationship between uncer-
tainty metrics and adversarial examples. In particular, we analyze
the effectiveness of uncertainty metrics in distinguishing AEs and
BEs. We adopt AUC-ROC [9] to evaluate the classification per-
formance of each metric. We utilize the score as the evaluation
criterion because it measures the performance without dependence
on a pre-setting threshold. Specifically, AUC-ROC is a performance
measurement for classification problems at various threshold set-
tings. ROC is short for receiver operating characteristic curve and
AUC represents degree or measure of separability. It gives us de-
tailed information on to what extent the evaluated model is capable
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of distinguishing between classes. In our metric effectiveness eval-
uation, the higher the AUC-ROC score, the better a metric is at
distinguishing AEs and BEs.
Table 3 shows the AUC-ROC scores achieved on different metrics
across different data. To be specific, we used 9, 000 BEs and 9, 000
AEs generated from each attack to calculate the AUC-ROC scores.
Overall, PCS achieves the best performance as it is a direct measure
of the prediction confidence of the target model. Interestingly, we
found that AEs often have low prediction confidence.
From the Bayesian uncertainty perspective, we found that VRO
achieves the best performance. On MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets,
all AUC-ROC scores are over 97%. On ImageNet, theminimumAUC-
ROC score is 77.47% in differentiating BEs and AEs generated by
Deepfool, while the scores on other attacks are all above 84%. From
the in-depth analysis, we found that VRO (refer to Definition 6)
captures the difference between the prediction of the original model
and multiple predictions of the randomized dropout-enabled model.
On the other hand, other metrics represent the uncertainty based
on the stability of the multi-shot predictions without considering
the model under analysis. For example, given an input, suppose
the prediction of the original model is incorrect and all predictions
of the dropout-enabled model are correct, the values of VR and
VRO would be 0 and 1, respectively. Intuitively, VRO shows that
the model is quite uncertain but VR indicates that the model is
very certain. In other words, VRO is more sensitive to capture
the uncertain behavior of the target model compared with other
uncertainty metrics.
Answer to RQ1: PCS of the originalmodel is often effec-
tive in distinguishing BEs and AEs generated by exist-
ing attacks. For the Bayesian uncertainty metrics, VRO
is often more effective than others when comparing
the prediction stability between the original model and
multiple dropout-enabled predictions.
3.3 Characterizing Data Behavior
PCS and Bayesian uncertainty depict the prediction results of a
DNN from different angles. In particular, existing studies demon-
strate that high prediction confidence is not equal to low Bayesian
uncertainty, and vice versa [11].
The prediction confidence (i.e., PCS) represents the confidence
of a single-shot model execution while the Bayesian uncertainty
is measured by the statistical results from multi-shot model ex-
ecutions. From RQ1, the results reveal that VRO stands out to
capture the different behaviors of BEs and AEs compared with
other Bayesian uncertainty metrics. Therefore, we adopt a two-
dimensional metric, i.e., (PCS, VRO), to characterize the BEs and
AEs on a specific DNN model. Based on this, the data is classified
into four patterns (see Fig. 2 (a)): low PCS and high VRO (LH), high
PCS and high VRO (HH), low PCS and low VRO (LL) and high PCS
and low VRO (HL). The categorization provides a way to understand
and analyze the behaviors of AEs and BEs.
3.4 RQ2: Categorization of Existing Data
Based on the categorization method, we perform a study towards
understanding the characteristics of BEs and AEs generated by
Table 3: The AUC-ROC scores of classification models with
different metrics.
Model Attacks PCS VRO VR PE MI
LeNet-5
BIM 99.98% 99.06% 90.72% 83.56% 81.52%
C&W 100.00% 99.08% 90.23% 82.86% 81.61%
Deepfool 99.44% 98.31% 93.47% 86.46% 84.78%
FGSM 99.98% 98.74% 95.52% 90.09% 87.36%
NIN
BIM 99.95% 99.46% 88.57% 86.73% 86.95%
C&W 99.90% 99.44% 87.93% 85.99% 86.48%
Deepfool 99.79% 99.18% 91.44% 88.64% 88.51%
FGSM 99.43% 98.80% 93.97% 91.69% 91.54%
ResNet-20
BIM 99.97% 98.20% 86.74% 84.62% 85.10%
C&W 99.88% 98.28% 85.87% 83.93% 84.59%
Deepfool 99.80% 97.85% 88.02% 85.70% 86.23%
FGSM 99.23% 97.28% 90.74% 88.25% 88.24%
MobileNet
BIM 99.95% 86.67% 84.25% 68.77% 68.37%
C&W 96.80% 84.49% 82.73% 67.80% 67.35%
Deepfool 79.36% 77.47% 77.13% 74.03% 72.32%
FGSM 97.79% 87.93% 86.49% 72.75% 71.84%
adversarial attacks and testing tools. To compute the VRO, we
follow the parameter configuration suggested in [12] and setT (see
Definition 6) as 50 for MNIST, and 100 for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet,
respectively.
Table 4 summarizes the quantitative results of BEs and AEs, w.r.t.
the two-dimensional metrics in four models. Note that the data in
the columns Benign, AEs from Attacks and AEs from Testing tools
are from the three sets of data presented in § 3.1.3. In each cell, the
two values represent the mean and variance of the corresponding
PCS and VRO metric results, respectively.
Overall, benign data mostly have high PCS and low VRO. The
mean values of PCS for the four models are 0.99, 0.953, 0.945 and
0.788, respectively, while the mean values of VRO are 0.293, 0.054,
0.072 and 0.337. The results are mostly in line with our expecta-
tions, i.e., BEs are expected to be predicted by the model with high
confidence and low uncertainty. In the case of MobileNet, the PCS
is relatively smaller than others while the VRO is larger than that of
other models. The reason is that MobileNet handles a more complex
task, i.e., image classification for a large-scale dataset (ImageNet).
It is more difficult to train a high-quality DNN model. MobileNet
we used here is among the state-of-the-art model for image clas-
sification in ImageNet, whose top-5 accuracy is 87.1%. This result
indicates that BEs usually belong to the HL type.
For AEs generated by different attacks, the metric performance
is mostly contrary to BEs, i.e., AEs generated by attacks usually
come with low PCS and high VRO. Except for the AEs generated by
Deepfool on ImageNet, all the mean values of PCS are rather low
(e.g., almost all PCS values are below 0.1) and the mean values of
VRO are relatively high (e.g., all VRO values are larger than 0.652).
It indicates that AEs generated from state-of-the-art adversarial
attacks usually fall into the category with low confidence and high
uncertainty. From the results, we find that AEs usually belong to
the LH type.
For the adversarial data generated from testing tools, we found
that the obtained metrics are between BEs and AEs generated from
the adversarial attacks. The mean values of PCS are smaller than
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Table 4: Results (mean / variance) of benign & adversarial data.
Model Metric Benign AEs from Attacks AEs from Testing tools
BIM C&W Deepfool FGSM DH-KMNC DH-NC TensorFuzz
LeNet-5
PCS 0.990 / 0.004 0.018 / 0.001 0.002 / 8.865e-06 0.186 / 0.114 0.012 / 1e-4 0.561/0.119 0.592/0.112 0.579/0.111
VRO 0.312 / 0.017 0.733 / 0.008 0.735 / 0.008 0.697 / 0.009 0.716 / 0.009 0.631/0.019 0.625/0.020 0.630/0.020
NIN
PCS 0.953 / 0.023 0.007 / 0.0004 0.013 / 0.0003 0.027 / 0.007 0.083 / 0.005 0.571/0.113 0.608/0.110 0.384/ 0.093
VRO 0.054 / 0.016 0.777 / 0.025 0.777 / 0.027 0.720 / 0.026 0.679 / 0.029 0.380/0.065 0.352/0.063 0.615/0.039
ResNet-20
PCS 0.945 / 0.026 0.005 / 0.0002 0.016 / 0.0005 0.023 / 0.006 0.096 / 0.006 0.548/0.108 0.574/0.109 0.392/0.093
VRO 0.072 / 0.023 0.865 / 0.010 0.869 / 0.010 0.850 / 0.010 0.828 / 0.012 0.398/0.080 0.388/0.080 0.457/0.062
MobileNet
PCS 0.788 / 0.082 0.002 / 1.598e-05 0.085 / 0.020 0.415 / 0.135 0.059 / 0.002 0.601/0.160 0.659/0.119 0.614/0.126
VRO 0.337 / 0.062 0.679 / 0.015 0.652 / 0.017 0.596 / 0.054 0.696 / 0.016 0.454/0.080 0.451/0.077 0.551/0.083
the PCS results of BEs but often larger than the results of AEs
from attacks. Conversely, the mean values of VRO are larger than
the VRO results of BEs but smaller than the results of AEs from
adversarial attacks. For example, consider the metric results of BEs,
TensorFuzz AEs and C&W AEs on ResNet-20, the PCS values are
0.945, 0.392 and 0.016, respectively, while the VRO values are 0.072,
0.457 and 0.869. Compared with the results of BEs, we can still reach
a similar conclusion that AEs from testing tools also belong to the
LH type.
Even so, the results of AEs from adversarial attacks and testing
tools have some differences. This might be caused by their differ-
ences in the test generation methods. Current adversarial attacks
usually adopt the gradient-based or optimization-based technique
to gradually decrease the predictive probability or the logit value
of the truth label until the decision result changes. For example,
when the probability of the truth label is reduced to 0.49 and the
probability of another label becomes 0.51, an adversarial example
is found and the attack stops. DeepHunter and TensorFuzz adopt
the mutation-based technique to generate new tests. The random
mutation can not guarantee that the predictive probability of the
truth label is decreased gradually. For example, the probability may
change from 0.99 to 0.10 by only one mutation, resulting in a higher
PCS. In summary, although both adversarial attacks and testing
tools can generate AEs, the behaviors of such generated AEs are
different in terms of PCS and VRO. Therefore, this further confirms
the difference between testing and adversarial attack, from the per-
spective of software engineering. Testing can not only simulate
real-world scenarios to uncover potential issues of a DL software
for deployment, but also generate more diverse data to capture the
behaviors of the DNN systematically in the applied context.
Comparing the results of BEs and AEs, we also found that there
also exists a tentative inverse correlation between PCS and VRO. For
example, the PCS of BEs is often large and the VRO is small. The
PCS of AEs from adversarial attacks is often small while the VRO
is large. For AEs generated from testing tools, the PCS tends to be
larger and the VRO is smaller. It is reasonable since high prediction
confidence usually reflects that the prediction is relatively certain.
Answer to RQ2: BEs and AEs usually belong to the HL
type and LH type, respectively. Comparedwith state-of-
the-art adversarial attacks, testing tools to some extent
generate different AEs.
4 UNCOMMON DATA GENERATION
The results of RQ2 reveal that BEs and AEs usually belong to the
HL type and LH type, respectively. However, several questions still
remain, i.e. whether there exist: 1) data samples with high PCS
and high VRO (i.e., the HH type), 2) data with low PCS and low
VRO (i.e., the LL type), 3) BEs with low PCS and high VRO (i.e.,
the LH BEs) and 4) AEs with high PCS and low VRO (i.e., the HL
AEs). These samples have the potential to uncover the unknown
behaviors of DNN, which are largely missed by existing methods.
To answer these questions, we developed a tool, KuK , to generate
such uncommon data.1
As PCS and VRO on existing data usually follow an inverse corre-
lation, it is non-trivial to generate the uncommon data. In fact, the
test data generation of specific types could be a complicated opti-
mization problem. In this paper, we leverage the Genetic Algorithm
(GA) [35] to provide a solution.
Fig. 2 b) shows the workflow of our algorithm. The inputs of KuK
include a seed x (i.e., an initial image 2), a model M , the dropout
enabled modelMd and a target type c . The output is a set of data
samples that satisfy the objective. We elaborate on the details of
each step as follows.
Population Initialization. Given an input image, we first gen-
erate a set of images by randomly adding noise to it. In order to
generate high-quality images (i.e., recognizable by human), we aban-
don the affine transformation (e.g., translation and rotation [55])
as the crossover may generate invalid images. We use L∞ norm to
constrain the allowable changes between the original seed and its
generated counterpart.
Objective and FitnessCalculation. In each iteration, we check
whether some generated images (in the population) satisfy the ob-
jective, which is specifically designed for each type based on PCS
and VRO. The test generation continues until some desirable data
inputs are obtained. To satisfy the objective, we design a set of
piecewise fitness functions to generate different types of uncommon
data such that the higher the corresponding fitness value, the better
the input.
We use X to denote the population, i.e., a set of images, and use
PCS(X ,M) to denote {PCS(x ,M)|x ∈ X }. Given the input x and
1We refer to these data as "uncommon" in the sense that they are rarely uncovered by existing
techniques rather than that they rarely exist. Such data could occur widely in the real world.
2In this paper, although we mainly focus on the image domain, the approach can also generalize to
other domains.
ICSE ’20, May 23–29, 2020, Seoul, Republic of Korea Xiyue Zhang, Xiaofei Xie, Lei Ma and et al.
model M , the objectives and the fitness functions are defined as
follows:
• For the LL type, the objective is PCS(x ,M) < p ∧VRO(x ,M) <
v , where p and v are configurable parameters, and the fitness
function is:
F itLL (x ) =
{ −PCS (x, M ), min(PCS (X , M )) > p
(PCS (x, M ) < p) −VRO (x, M ), otherwise
(1)
If the minimum PCS of the population is larger than p, we use
−PCS(x ,M) to decrease the PCS until there are some inputs
whose PCSs are belowp. Due to the custom inverse correlation be-
tween PCS and VRO, VRO tends to increase when PCS decreases.
As for the fitness function in the other situation, (PCS(x ,M) < p)
aims to ensure that the PCS is still below p while −VRO(x ,M)
stands out for a smaller VRO.
• For the HH type, the objective is PCS(x ,M) > p ∧VRO(x ,M) >
v , where p and v are configurable parameters, and the fitness
function is:
F itHH (x ) =
{
PCS (x, M ), max (PCS (X , M )) < p
(PCS (x, M ) > p) +VRO (x, M ), otherwise
(2)
If the maximum PCS of X is smaller than p, we increase the PCS
until some PCSs are larger thanp. In addition, we ensure the PCSs
is larger than p (PCS(x ,M) > p), and in the meantime attempt to
increase VRO (+VRO(x ,M)).
• To generate AEs which belong to the HL type, the objective is set
as: PCS(x ,M) > p ∧VRO(x ,M) < v ∧ x is an AE, where p and v
are the configurable parameters, and the fitness function is:
F itAHL (x ) =

−PCS (x, M ), ∀x ′ ∈ X , x ′is BE
AE(x ) + PCS (x, M ), ∃x ′ ∈ X , x ′is AE
∧max (PCS (X , M )) < p
AE(x ) + (PCS (x, M ) > p) otherwise
−VRO (x, M ),
(3)
where AE(x) is 1 if x is an AE. Otherwise, it is 0.
The generation of HL AEs is extremely challenging since HL is
the typical feature of BEs. To address the problem, we design
a three-step approach. If all images in the population are BEs
(step 1), we aim to generate AEs by decreasing the PCS, which is
commonly used by state-of-the-art attacks. Whenever any inputs
become AEs and all PCSs become smaller than p (step 2), we
increase PCS but still keep the high priority of AE (i.e., AE has
a high fitness value with the support of AE(x)). For example, if
an AE becomes BE but achieves high PCS, its fitness value will
decrease. In the last step, we set AE and high PCS as the high
priority, then decrease VRO.
• To generate BEs that belong to LH type, the objective is set as:
PCS(x ,M) < p ∧ VRO(x ,M) > v and x is a BE. The fitness
function is designed as follows:
F itBLH (x ) =

BE(x ) − PCS (x, M ), min(PCS (X , M )) > p
BE(x ) + (PCS (x, M ) < p) otherwise
+VR(x, M )
(4)
where BE(x) is 1 if x is a BE. Otherwise, it is 0.
Similarly, the generation of LH BEs is also challenging as LH is a
typical feature of AEs. In the first step, if all PCSs are larger than
p, we first decrease the PCS but keep the high priority of BE. In
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Figure 3: The distribution of different types of data gener-
ated onNIN byKuK . The orange color represents AEs, while
green color represents BEs. Star, circle, triangle anddiamond
represent the data of HH, LL, LH and HL, respectively.
the second step, when there are some BEs with low PCSs, we
increase the VRO but keep the high priority of BE and low PCS.
Crossover and Mutation. For the crossover, we adopt the tour-
nament selection strategy to select two tournaments. From each
tournament, we select one image, which has the largest fitness value.
The two selected images are used to perform the crossover by ran-
domly exchanging the corresponding pixels. After the crossover,
each image is randomly mutated by adding white noise, to increase
the diversity of the population. The test generation continues until
the objective is satisfied or the given computation resource (e.g.,
time limit) exhausts.
5 EVALUATION
We implemented the proposed test generation tool, KuK , in Python
based on Keras [5] (2.2.4) with TensorFlow [1] (1.12.0) as backend.
In this section, we aim to evaluate the usefulness of KuK in gener-
ating uncommon data (RQ3) and the effectiveness of these data in
bypassing the defense techniques (RQ4). All the experiments were
run on a server with the Ubuntu 16.04 system with 28-core 2.0GHz
Xeon CPU, 196 GB RAM and 4 NVIDIA Tesla V100 16G GPUs.
5.1 RQ3: Usefulness of Test Data Generation
Setting.We adopt KuK to generate different types of uncommon
data on four widely used DL models – LeNet-5, NIN , ResNet-20 and
MobileNet. In the genetic algorithm, the size of the population is set
as 100, the crossover rate is set as 0.5 and the mutation rate is 0.005.
For the mutation process, the radius of L∞ is set as 0.3. For each
dataset, we randomly select 200 BEs as the initial seeds. For each
seed, we generate four types of uncommon data. The maximum
number of the iterations in the genetic algorithm is set to 50.
Threshold Selection. To perform the categorization, we need to
set the upper bound for the low PCS/VRO, the lower bound for the
high PCS/VRO, i.e., the configuration values of the parameters p
and v in the objective and fitness functions. Actually, in Table 4,
the results of BEs (HL) and AEs (LH) generated from adversarial
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attacks are the extreme cases, which can act as the guidance to
select the thresholds.
• High PCS. For the lower bound of high PCS, we set it as 0.7 as all
high PCSs from BEs in the four models are above 0.7. Specifically,
the minimum value of high PCS of BEs is 0.788 in MobileNet.
Intuitively, if the PCS of a data sample is above 0.7, we regard it
as a data sample with high PCS.
• Low VRO. For the upper bound of the low VRO, we set the value
as 0.4 since the low VROs of BEs in the four models are below
0.4 (e.g., 0.312 and 0.337 for LeNet-5 andMobileNet, respectively).
If the VRO of a data sample is below 0.4, we categorize it into
low VRO type.
• Low PCS. For the upper bound of the low PCS, most of the low
PCSs of AEs in Table 4 are below 0.1 while the PCS of samples
generated by Deepfool forMobileNet has a larger value 0.415. We
made a compromise and set the value as 0.3. If the PCS of a data
sample is below 0.3, we regard that it falls into low PCS category.
• High VRO. For the lower bound of high VRO, we set it as 0.6
because almost all of the high VROs of AEs in the four models
are larger than 0.6 (one exception is 0.596 in MobileNet). If the
VRO is above 0.6, we regard it as high VRO.
Results. Fig. 3 depicts the distribution of the 200 generated data
on the two-dimension plane (due to page limit, the results of other
models are put on our website [54]). Note that there are some seeds
from which we failed to generate the uncommon data satisfying
the objective. For each of these seeds, we plot the best result from
the population (e.g., for HH type, we select the data, which has the
maximum of the sum of PCS and VRO). The results show that KuK
enables to generate inputs with diverse uncertainty patterns.
Table 5 shows the number of uncommon data inputs that satisfy
the objective and the mean PCS and VRO value. Row Type Objective
shows the objective setting for each uncommon uncertainty pattern
in terms of upper and lower bound of PCS and VRO. For each
model, Row Total and PCS/VRO give the total number of uncommon
data generated for each type and the mean value of PCS and VRO,
respectively. For LL and HH types, the results of generated AEs and
BEs are shown separately (i.e., Column Ben and Column Adv).
The results demonstrate that KuK is effective in generating LL
and HH data inputs that are rarely covered by existing methods. For
example, for NIN model, KuK generated 198 (99%) LL data in total,
of which 176 data are BEs and 22 data are AEs. For ResNet-20, KuK
generated the LL data and HH data for all seeds (i.e., 200). From the
quantitative result of LL data, we could find that LL data tend to be
BEs (e.g., the number of LL BEs is much larger than the number of
LL AEs). Considering the natural BEs usually belong to HL (refer
to Table 4), it indicates that low VRO is a better metric to represent
the characteristics of BEs. For the HH data, there is no such obvious
trend. In particular, for LeNet-5 and MobileNet, the number of HH
BEs is larger than the number of HH AEs. However, the case in
NIN and ResNet-20 is on the contrary.
For LH BEs and HL AEs, it is more challenging to generate them
since they are completely opposite to the characteristics of the
common data. The results show that KuK is useful to generate
such uncommon data. For example, we generated 172 (86%), 58
(29%), 67 (33.5%) and 152 (76%) LH BEs for LeNet-5, NIN , ResNet-20
and MobileNet, respectively. For HL AEs, we found that KuK only
generated one HL AE for LeNet-5. For other models, KuK generated
165 (82.5%), 93 (46.5%) and 74 (37%) HLAEs, respectively. The results
indicate that generating LH BEs and HL AEs is more difficult and
KuK can still generate them for a part of seeds.
We can see that the PCS and VRO in Table 5 are consistent with
those in Table 4. For example, although we set the lower bound of
high PCS as 0.7 in the fitness functions and objectives, KuK still
generated very high PCS for HH and HL data. The mean value
of PCS is larger than 0.9 in LeNet-5, NIN , and ResNet-20, which is
very consistent with the high PCS of BEs in Table 4. Even we set
the upper bound of low VRO as 0.4, KuK still generated data with
pretty low VRO, e.g., for NIN and ResNet-20, the VROs of LL data
are 0.095 and 0.105, respectively.
Comparing the results among the four models, we could find
that the difficulty in generating uncommon data varies for different
models. For example, KuK is effective in generating LL and HH
data for LeNet-5, NIN , and ResNet-20, but only generated 88 (44%)
and 81 (40.5%) forMobileNet. For LeNet-5 andMobileNet, it is easier
to generate LH BEs than HL AEs but the case in NIN and ResNet-20
is on the contrary. These differences show that the uncommon
data generated through KuK can be used to characterize different
behaviors of the models.
Answer to RQ3: KuK is useful for generating different
types of uncommon data. The HL BEs and HL AEs are
often more difficult to be generated.
5.2 RQ4: Evaluation on Defense Techniques
To demonstrate the usefulness of the generated uncommon data
in Table 5, this experiment intends to study whether the data can
bypass the existing defense techniques.
Setting. Since different defense techniques are proposed on dif-
ferent subject datasets, we selected popular techniques based on the
datasets. For MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset, we selected the follow-
ing defense techniques: binary activation classifier [13], mutation-
based adversarial attack detection [53], defensive distillation [40],
label smoothing [17], and feature squeezing [57]. For ImageNet,
we selected the mutation-based adversarial attack detection [53],
input transformations [15] and pixel deflection [43]. Due to the
space limit, we put the details about the configuration and the
introduction of each defense technique on our website [54].
To validate the performance of the defense techniques, we se-
lected 1) the common data including 9,000 BEs and 9,000 AEs gen-
erated from the existing adversarial attacks (§ 3.1.3), and 2) the
uncommon data from Table 5. We use the success rate to evaluate
the capability of the defense technique, i.e., divide the number of
BEs/AEs, which can be correctly identified, by the total number.
Results. Table 6 and 7 show the results about the performance
of the defense techniques on four models. Column/Row Comm
represents the success rate on existing common data. The results
show that the defense techniques are very effective in identifying
BEs and AEs of the common data, especially on the smaller models.
For example, except for that the success rate of feature squeezing is
88.1% on ResNet-20, the success rates of other defense techniques are
above 90% onNIN , ResNet-20, and LeNet-5. In particular, the success
rate is above 97% on LeNet-5. For the larger model MobileNet, the
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Table 5: Results of different types of data generated by KuK .
Type Objective LL (<0.3/<0.4) HH (>0.7/>0.6) LH (<0.3/>0.6) HL (>0.7/<0.4)Ben Adv Ben Adv Ben Adv
LeNet-5 Total 124 18 130 46 172 1PCS/VRO 0.067/0.324 0.030/0.343 0.947/0.720 0.903/0.803 0.082/0.609 0.99/0.339
NIN Total 176 22 10 184 58 165PCS/VRO 0.065/0.095 0.065/0.204 0.960/0.846 0.922/0.910 0.073/0.666 0.981/0.245
ResNet-20 Total 168 32 11 181 67 93PCS/VRO 0.065/0.105 0.064/0.224 0.960/0.851 0.921/0.910 0.058/0.655 0.978/0.253
MobileNet Total 83 5 70 11 152 74PCS/VRO 0.234/0.348 0.192/0.348 0.845/0.714 0.784/0.785 0.092/0.719 0.915/0.328
success rate is relatively low as it is more difficult to perform the
defense for the complex model.
Column/RowUnCo represents the success rate on the uncommon
data generated from KuK . The overall result shows that the existing
defense techniques perform poorly on the uncommon data we
generated. We could find that the success rate of the binary classifier
and mutation-based detection are reduced a lot. For example, on
NIN , the success rate is reduced to 25.5% and 5.5%, respectively.
The reason is that these two techniques mainly depend on the PCS
and VRO characteristics for detection. Specifically, binary classifier
is trained with the value of logit layer that is closely related to
prediction confidence and the label change ratio in mutation-based
detection is similar to VRO. The uncommon data is very different
from the common data w.r.t. these two metrics. As a result, if they
perform well on common data, the success rate on the uncommon
data could be low.
For other defense techniques, the reduction in success rate ap-
pears smaller than that of binary classifier and mutation-based de-
tection. For example, the success rates drop to 78.3% and 76.2% for
defensive distillation and label smoothing on NIN . The reason is that
a new model is retrained with these defense techniques, while the
attacks are generated regarding to the original one, making it a
more challenging transfer attack scenario. For example, defensive
distillation retrains a more robust model by reducing the gradients.
In this case, some of the data, which are uncommon for original
model, become common data w.r.t. the retrained model, because
of some weight variation. However, it still can be seen from the
results that the uncommon data reveal stronger transferability.
We also found that the uncommon data on LeNet-5 is not effec-
tive on defensive distillation and label smoothing. We performed
an investigation and found that it may be caused by the following
reasons. 1) Most of the data become common in the new model. It
confirms the usefulness of uncommon data in characterizing the
different behaviors of multiple models. 2) Most of the uncommon
data generated on LeNet-5 are BEs (see Table 5). The success rate is
reduced to 90.8% and 79.9% if we only use the uncommon AEs.
Answer to RQ4: The uncommon data inputs are not
well defended by existing defense techniques while the
common data are relatively easier to be defended. In
particular, the binary classifier andmutation-based de-
tection approaches are less useful in defending the un-
common data inputs (e.g., with only 5% and 10% on NIN
and ResNet-20, respectively).
Table 6: Success rate of the defense techniques on the gener-
ated data for NIN , ResNet-20 and LeNet-5.
NIN ResNet-20 LeNet5
Comm UnCo Comm UnCo Comm UnCo
#Data 18,000 615 18,000 552 18,000 491
binary classifier 0.944 0.255 0.958 0.159 0.986 0.303
mutation-based 0.975 0.055 0.985 0.101 0.97 0.390
distillation 0.93 0.786 0.913 0.773 0.985 0.963
label smoothing 0.936 0.762 0.921 0.748 0.981 0.934
feature squezzing 0.905 0.663 0.881 0.637 0.973 0.327
6 THREAT TO VALIDITY
The selection of the subject datasets and DNN models could be a
threat to validity. We try to counter this by using three publically
available datasets with diverse scales, and popular pre-trained DNN
models that achieve competitive performance.
The selection of the thresholds for the categorization may affect
the results of Table 5.We carefully select the thresholds based on the
results of Table 4. Furthermore, the results of Table 5 are relatively
consistent with the results of Table 4, indicating that the selection
basically does not affect the results of Table 5.
A further threat would be the randomness factors for comput-
ing the VRO (i.e., configuration parameter T in § 6). The previous
work [3] found that the result is not sensitive to the choice of T as
long asT is greater than 20 in CIFAR-10 and MNIST. We follow the
configuration in the existing paper [12], i.e., 50, 100, 100 for MNIST,
CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. In addition, we tested that the values are
sufficient for computing the stable VRO.
7 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we summarize the most relevant work to ours.
Attack and defense. Ever since the demonstration of deep learn-
ing models being vulnerable to even a small perturbation of input
data [49], a sequence of attack techniques have been developed on
the strand. To date, multiple types of attacks including FGSM [14],
JSMA [39], BIM [24],DeepFool [37], C&W [4] have been proposed; a
parallel research focus on improving the robustness of deep learning
models. Goodfellow et al. [14] presented a method of introducing
nonlinear model families into the training process. Defensive dis-
tillation was introduced to reduce the effectiveness of adversarial
samples [40], which was then broken by C&W attack [4]. Mean-
while, a set of recent defense techniques was surveyed and shown
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Table 7: Success rate of the defense techniques on the gener-
ated data forMobileNet.
#Data mutation-based input trans deflection
Comm 18,000 0.865 0.702 0.782
UnCo 395 0.549 0.660 0.688
that all could be defeated by constructing new loss functions [3].
A more recent work [34] exploited the framework of robust opti-
mization for network adversarial training to resist a wide range
of attacks. Besides dealing with datasets like MNIST and CIFAR10,
defense techniques [15, 43] were also proposed to handle real-world
large-scale datasets like ImageNet. However, it still lacks a study on
the characteristics of BEs and AEs generated through these meth-
ods, which we attempt to attain from the uncertainty perspective.
Uncertaintymeasures. In general, a deep learningmodel is trained
with a dataset and results in a set of fixed parameters, which further
sets up a deterministic function mapping an input to a probabil-
ity distribution. Bayesian approach, however, does not view deep
learning models as deterministic functions; instead, they treat the
parameters as random variables [33]. As a representative work to
solve the scalability problem of obtaining uncertainty measures,
[12] proposed a dropout-based solution, which allows us to calculate
uncertainty estimates of existing deep learning models with a good
trade-off between uncertainty quality and computational complex-
ity. Existing research on uncertainty measure applications mainly
focuses on the adversary detection problem. For example, [10] used
both density estimates and Bayesian uncertainty estimates to learn
a regression model for adversarial example detection. Further, an
empirical study on two types of uncertainty measures, predictive
entropy and mutual information, was proposed to understand the
effectiveness of them for detection [46]. However, in our work, we
perform a comparative study on both single-shot and multi-shot
execution uncertainty estimates to dig out the uncertainty patterns
that existing AEs/BEs followed.
Testing and debugging. Researchers have attempted to leverage
decades of advances in the software engineering community to
seek for solutions towards more secure and robust DL systems and
have developed a set of fruitful results. These approaches share
a different spirit from those in the DL community, and, for the
first time, have been evidenced to be unique and promising without
studies. Testing criteria come out as the first research focus. A series
of measurements have been adapted to evaluate the quality of DL
test dataset, including neuron coverage [41], multi-granularity cov-
erage criteria [29], MC/DC test criteria [47], combinatorial testing
criteria [28] , surprise adequacy [22] and uncertainty-based met-
rics [32]. Classic testing methodologies have also been incorporated
for DNN testing, including differential testing [41], coverage-guided
testing [38, 52, 55], mutation testing [30] and concolic testing [48].
Some advanced test generation methods [7, 56, 58] have also been
proposed to achieve better testing for different applications. Similar
to samples generated by adversarial attacks, it still lacks a study
on the relationship of samples generated by testing techniques and
uncertainty. In addition, the results of this paper confirm the differ-
ence between testing and adversarial attack, in obtaining samples
with different uncertainty behaviors.
Some recent efforts have beenmade to debugDLmodels [31], and
to study DL program bugs [60], library bugs [42] and DL software
bugs across different frameworks and platforms [16]. The results
of this paper provide a new angle to characterize DL model defects,
which could be useful for other quality assurance activities besides
testing.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
This paper performed an empirical study to characterize the data
inputs from the perspective of uncertainty. We first presented an
empirical study on the capability of uncertainty metrics in differen-
tiating AEs and BEs. Then, we performed a systematic study of the
characteristics of BEs and AEs generated by existing attack/testing
methods in terms of uncertainty metrics. The results reveal that
existing BEs and AEs largely fall into two uncertainty patterns
in terms of PCS and VRO. Based on the investigation results, we
proposed a GA-based automated test generation technique to gen-
erate data with more diverse uncertainty patterns, especially those
uncommon samples. The results demonstrated the usefulness of
the generated data in bypassing defense techniques. In future, we
plan to perform more in-depth investigations on the application
of the uncommon data towards robustness enhancement. We be-
lieve further understanding of these uncommon data is crucial for
building reliable and trustworthy DL solutions.
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